

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

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MITIGATING THE TYRANNY, A MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

by

Marianne Mjelde Knutsen, Major, Royal Norwegian Air Force

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Advisor: Dr. Donald A McCuish

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Abstract

“Mitigating the tyranny, a moral responsibility” takes basis in Michael Walzer’s description of “The Tyranny of War,” where the political decision makers are the tyrants who send soldiers into the tyranny. When given the power to make such decisions, they also have a moral responsibility to mitigate the tyranny. The first part of the essay explains why the decision makers have this responsibility, by referring to Michael Walzer’s Just War Theory and the threefold responsibility decision makers have in justifying their decisions towards the international community – *jus ad bellum, in bello and post bellum*. Decision makers should also have the same responsibility towards their soldiers who are the victims of their decisions. This Just War Theory is further used to underscore the complexity of the tyranny and to explain what the mitigation of this encompasses. Although the military itself has a responsibility to mitigate the tyranny, the decision makers’ responsibility lies in their awareness of, interest in and focus on the military and the reality of the tyranny. Their role in the mitigation of the tyranny is also to ensure the nation’s support and backing of their soldiers, their awareness and acknowledgement of the soldiers effort and struggles in the threefold tyranny. The second part of the essay discusses how the contemporary Norwegian decision makers have allowed this sense of responsibility to decline, thus not contributing to the mitigation of the tyranny. Even though Norway is a nation in “deep peace” after the end of the Cold War, the tyranny for the soldiers are still present through numerous force commitments in UN and NATO operations.

Michael Walzer, one of the world's most eminent philosophers on the subject of war and ethics, describes in his book, *Just and unjust wars, a moral argument with historical illustrations*, "The Tyranny of War." "War has human agents and human victims...these human agents are responsible for the pain and death that follow from their decisions, or at least for the pain and death of all those persons who do not choose war as a personal enterprise."¹ At first sight, one relates the tyrants to the dictators or the evil regimes that wage war for their own interests for the wrong reasons, and force their soldiers to fight. However, that was not necessarily Walzer's intent. There is no reason not to relate the human agents to our own contemporary decision makers, and the human victims of death and pain, to our own soldiers. In that context, our decision makers become tyrants in sending soldiers to war, and the pain and death they cause to our soldiers, the tyranny. With the power of making such decisions, there is a moral responsibility to mitigate the tyranny. This essay has two parts. The first part explains why decision makers have this moral responsibility and how this relates to the tyranny. Further, a discussion on what this responsibility encompasses and why it is important in the mitigation of the tyranny follows. The second part considers the Norwegian political decision makers as the tyrants, and gives examples on how a decline in their sense of this responsibility has emerged. The soldiers, of course, are the Norwegian Armed Forces (NoAF).

Why do our decision makers have a moral responsibility to mitigate the tyranny? The military is one of a nation's instruments of power (IOP), and this instrument is used to reach political objectives. As Clausewitz has defined it, "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means."² The foundation of this military IOP is soldiers, human individuals, thus rendering human individuals their instrument of power. "[C]ombatants are not amoral agents or machines, nor are they mere weapons to be placed in combat against the enemy's weapons of

war. Warriors are persons—they are body-mind-spirit.”³ When the decision makers decide to use their military IOP, they decide that soldiers should leave their families and homes, risk their own lives, take lives and try to survive. They decide that these soldiers will live in fear and uncertainty and witness atrocities and killings that haunt their conscience. They decide that these soldiers may never be able to recover from what they have experienced. They decide that the tyranny also has consequences for the soldiers’ families and friends then and in the future. When thinking of the tyranny these decisions cause, it is natural to draw a connection to the responsibility our decision makers hold. To continue with Walzer’s terminology and Just War Theory, he discusses *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello* and *jus post bellum*.⁴ *Jus ad bellum* handles justice in decisions to go to war, *jus in bello* handles justice in conduct of war and *jus post bellum* handles justice after the war. In short, the expressions are terminology used in Just War Theory to address a nation’s responsibility to be able to morally justify all phases of war, all in light of the severe consequences war brings. If nations have this responsibility towards the domestic and international community, the nation’s decision makers should also have that moral responsibility towards its soldiers, their instruments of power. This responsibility should not only include thorough and careful consideration in going to war, but also the moral responsibility to mitigate the tyranny. This is in respect of the soldiers that become human victims because of their decisions. “[F]or it is false to suggest that representative functions are morally risk-free. They are instead peculiarly risky, precisely because statesmen, officers and revolutionaries act for other people and with wide-ranging effects. They act sometimes so as to endanger the people they represent....they can hardly complain if we hold them subject to moral judgment.”⁵ The referenced Just War Theory is also relevant to explain the moral responsibility in relation to the tyranny as threefold, before, during and after war.

The moral responsibility in *jus ad bellum* revolves around justifying why the soldiers are sent into the tyranny. Our soldiers need reasons, incentives and motivation to endure the extreme conditions and the extreme experiences. “They [warriors] are complex moral agents who must live and fight within the context of military protocol and duty; warriors are rarely the unthinking weapons or tools of nation-states.”⁶ The soldiers need to be able to justify to themselves why this is important and that the risks they take are worthwhile. They need to justify to their families why they have to leave and expose themselves to the fears and uncertainty of war. They need to justify to themselves how it is possible to risk their own lives and possibly taking others’ in order to achieve a political or military goal. Without thorough motivation or reasons, our soldiers will enter war half-hearted and less robust in encountering the extremities of the tyranny. If not dedicated and confident in the mission, the burden of the tyranny will be heavier to carry.

The moral responsibility in *jus in bello* is in the context of bringing justice to their reactions and actions in the conduct of war. The soldiers face horrors and dilemmas. They see women and children being killed, hunger, injuries, and unbelievable brutality. They face child soldiers with guns that threaten their own lives. They live in constant fear and uncertainty, the enemy is unpredictable in where, when and how it will attack. The soldiers need help and support to handle these experiences. The soldiers need to know that they can talk about and debrief their actions after they have occurred. They need to be able to share their experienced dilemmas and horrors. They need to be able to defuse their emotional reactions and made aware of that such reactions are part of human nature. “Combatants are human beings who operate with reason and usually with moral direction, people who are rarely so focused or intent on completing the mission (military necessity) that they factor out human emotions like empathy and sympathy, even in sometimes brutal conditions of combat.”⁷ If the soldiers are allowed to

keep their experiences to themselves and to hide their reactions, the effects of the tyranny will be hard to overcome. “It is to the point that warriors are soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen who must kill when legally ordered to do so but must live with those decisions for the rest of their lives.”⁸

The moral responsibility in *jus post bellum* revolves around bringing justice to the aftermath of war. They need not only to be welcomed with a medal and speeches on their contributions to the battle, but also attention to the tyranny they have experienced. They need help and support to be able to cope with the aftermaths’ thoughts, sleeplessness, nightmares and frustrations. They need help to be able to recover and integrate themselves into everyday life and work. Their families and friends need help to understand and grasp why their loved ones have become silent and angry. Iasiello describes this as “Warrior transition.” “This criterion addresses a nation's moral obligation to heal the visible and invisible wounds of its warriors by adequately preparing them for their inevitable return and reentry into the society. When warriors return to their society they must be physically and emotionally equipped to handle life outside the warzone; it is, therefore, the military's obligation to ensure that every combatant transitions from a hostile-fire environment to the normalcy of life in garrison, at home, and in the society.”⁹ The tyranny represents long-term consequences for the soldiers, their families and friends, and they must not be forgotten in their struggles. “In the *post bellum* phase of war, belligerents have a moral responsibility to address and heal the wounds of war.”¹⁰

Then, what exactly does decision makers’ moral responsibility encompass, and why is this important in the mitigation of the tyranny? First, it is important to clarify that the military itself carries responsibilities to mitigate the tyranny in all three phases. As mentioned, it is a tool subject to the politicians’ decisions. The military has been given the roles, the objectives, and the

funding, and therefore holds the responsibility to train, equip and educate its forces, in order to be an effective instrument. However, the military's responsibilities rest at a different level.

That level is about military leaders' sharing and taking part in the tyranny. That level is about always taking care of their people - *ad bello, in bello* and *post bellum*, regardless of mission or degree of tyranny. To use military terminology to simplify and visualize the difference in levels, one may call this the "operational and tactical" level of moral responsibility to mitigate the tyranny. The decision makers' responsibility then rests on the "strategic" level and as military theory states, the balance and linkage between all levels are important to achieve the objective. The objective in this case is the mitigation of the tyranny. The linkage and balance between decision makers' and military's levels of responsibilities can then be seen through that the tyranny starts with the political decision to send soldiers into the tyranny, and continues throughout the "Warrior transition"¹¹.

The politicians' "strategic" level of responsibility encompasses the nation as a whole. "Nations that wage war have a responsibility to those who fight in wars, to their families, and to society at large."¹² The politicians are responsible for that their decisions to send soldiers into tyranny, is deeply rooted in the society. They are responsible for the population's awareness of the tyranny and the consequences of their decisions. Politicians have the responsibility to be the soldiers' backbone in the tyranny, to support and stand behind their soldiers, before, during and after armed conflict. This will give the soldiers pride and acknowledgement in their efforts, and the feeling of not being alone in the tyranny. They will simply know that the tyranny is worthwhile. Simply put; that they "do not die in vain."¹³ "It makes sense to begin with the head of state and the men and women immediately around him, who actually control the government

and make key decisions. Their accountability is clear, ...for they are the source rather than the recipients of superior orders.”¹⁴

The Norwegian decision makers have allowed their sense of moral responsibility to mitigate the tyranny to decline. The balance in the responsibility between military and politicians has changed because the politicians have allowed themselves and Norwegian citizens to lose interest in the military. The politicians have allowed the distance between the military and the nation - the civilian community, to grow. Thus, they have not adequately mitigated the tyranny. How and why has this happened?

Norway is a nation in “deep peace”. She has not been at war since World War II. Germany invaded Norway on 9 April 1940, and the occupation lasted 5 years. “Never again” has been the slogan ever since. “Never again” refers to the “broken rifle” policy in the interwar years, when the politicians asserted neutrality and de-armament of the military, thus rendering Norway with little capability to resist the German invasion.

After WW II, during the Cold War, Norway was strategically important because of its borders and proximity to the Soviet Union. Norway “enjoyed” focus and interest from her co-members in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With the threat from the “big bear” in the East, and still remembering WW II, the politicians focused on and had interest in a strong military force to defend Norwegian territory. This attitude was also deeply rooted in the Norwegian population, where the will and interest in a strong defense did not need much nurturing from politicians.

However, after the Cold War, there was no longer an immediate threat to Norwegian territory or security, and the international “popularity” of Norway and its strategic importance almost disappeared. With it, also the domestic “popularity” and importance of the Norwegian

military gradually declined. So far, this represents a logical chain of events. No significant threats, means no need for a strong military, thus there should not be anything wrong with the decline of interest in and focus on the military. However, the above only explains the political background and the historical events that led to this change and led Norway into “deep peace”. The tyranny, however, has not changed with the end of the Cold War, only the politicians’ awareness of their moral responsibility towards its soldiers.

The tyranny of war is present whenever or wherever the NoAF enter an armed conflict or war, whether it fought on Norwegian soil or not. When fighting on one’s own soil, as during WW II, the reasons and motivations are different. The justification of the tyranny during WW II rested within the will to survive, to protect families, communities, and to ensure your nations’ freedom. The tyranny was mitigated through the notion of “supreme emergency”, and that citizens, decision makers and soldiers all took part in the efforts to survive and free Norway from the occupants.¹⁵

Since WW II, Norwegian armed conflicts and the tyranny have not been a result of “supreme emergency” and have not been experienced on own soil. Since WW II, the NoAF has taken part in armed conflicts around the world. This has mainly been in operations as part of United Nations (UN) or NATO forces.¹⁶ The number of personnel currently in such operations is 864.¹⁷ This list of conflicts, (see Appendix A) in which NoAF participate, shows that the tyranny is very much present, and has been since WW II. It has not changed with the end of the Cold War and the removal of the threat from the East.

It is happening at a distance from Norwegian politicians and citizens. If one takes a closer look at the list, it in fact shows that the NoAF participation has, in reality, changed. From the perceived “easily defendable and less dangerous” UN peacekeeping operations in the Cold War

period, the armed conflicts and the violence in operations have increased. Examples are as part of Desert Shield and Storm in Kuwait, Allied Force in Bosnia and Kosovo, and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. It is a well-known fact that these operations have included a high degree of violence and risks for the soldiers.

The point, however, is not whether these are operations with or without NATO mandate or UN resolution. It is not about the number of soldiers that have participated. It is not about the obligation to NATO or the UN. It is about when the Norwegian decision makers agree to send soldiers to these operations, they are still not aware of the degree of the tyranny Norwegian forces face, or the responsibility they hold. How is this evident?

Firstly, it is evident in how the politicians address the operations in which the NoAF take part. They de-dramatize the severity by not calling it by its real name. They hide the brutality through safe and mild words. The tyranny has been hidden in traditional UN operations as humanitarian assistance or aid or peacekeeping operations. The articles and debates in Norwegian media since 2003 represent examples on reactions to this de-dramatization. “Major Mikalsen almost died in Afghanistan six weeks ago. Still in the hospital, he says that Norwegians have not thought through the consequences of the new and dangerous international missions. And why would Norwegians do that, as long as dangerous missions are sugared as humanitarian efforts because Bondevik and his government want this to be political acceptable?” Further, “Bondevik (the Prime Minister) has long had a problem. He does not like the reality of war. In his yearly speech at new-years, he thanked Norwegians in International Operations. However, he did not mention Norwegian Forces in war missions with one word; he just called them peacekeeping forces. It sounds nicer and safer... However, humanitarian soldiers do not exist. Soldiers are trained and equipped for war, also when their tasks are to build bridges or find

mines.”¹⁸ This shows that even the media, the voices of the population, react to the vagueness of the politicians. However, also representatives from the military raise their voices. The director of The Officers’ Joint Organization addresses this in an interview. “It is about time to call a spade for a spade. The Norwegian soldiers are in a war-like situation, and are an integrated part of the British forces in Iraq. It is close to ridiculous to assert that our soldiers are there to conduct humanitarian aid.” He continues. “It took four years before Prime Minister Bondevik admitted that Norway was participating in a war in Kosovo. Now the Prime Minister should define whether the soldiers’ main mission still is humanitarian aid or as part of a military force. The government owes this to both the soldiers in Iraq and to the Norwegian population. It is of no use anymore to say as the Minister of Defense, Kristin Krohn Devold, did, that the Iraqis have no problems in telling the difference between Norwegian forces and the occupants’ forces. This is too naive. Terrorists do not care whether the soldiers are Italian, American or Norwegian.”¹⁹ These are just examples of the debate in the media, and are a few of many perceived opinions, but it clearly shows that the Norwegian decision makers are not addressing the reality of operations to the Norwegian population. Their de-dramatization of the reality has consequences. The Norwegian population becomes unaware of the real tyranny, it just perceives this as another humanitarian assistance, as another UN operation that is “peaceful” and contributes to “a better world”. The population does not comprehend the severity in the operations the military takes part in, thus leaving them without interest and generally ignorant towards the military. The military suffers from the lack of support and backing in the population and the politicians, thus leaving the military alone in the tyranny and the efforts to mitigate this. It is too blunt to assert that the politicians do this with intent; however, it seems that the politicians are somewhat afraid to “upset” someone. The notion that they are simply not aware is simply too hard to comprehend

and unrealistic. Or is it? This leads to the second issue, where the lack of awareness towards the tyranny and the responsibility is surprisingly evident.

Since October 2002, Norwegian F-16s situated in Kirgizstan, had been conducting operations over Afghanistan. In January 2003, one of their missions resulted in the first Norwegian live bombing in armed conflict since WW II. This was not a surprise for the F-16 force. However, the bombing was a surprise to some of the Norwegian politicians. The debate in the aftermath makes one wonder whether the politicians are aware of the consequences of their decisions. In an interview with the F-16 forces, a Norwegian F-16 pilot said; “It seems like some politicians suddenly realized that we were there to deliver bombs, and that this is dangerous. However, they have sent us here. Politicians who are surprised we are delivering bombs do not know what they have used their instrument of power for.”²⁰ The National Contingent Commander (NCC), Colonel Gulseth, is somewhat more modest in his statement. “When we send fighter aircraft into this, one cannot be surprised that bombs are delivered. That is too stupid. However, it is natural that the debate is emerging. Delivering bombs is quite new.”²¹ The politicians who suddenly realized that to send soldiers into a warzone was “dangerous”, is fortunately not representing all the decision makers’ views. However, they are indeed a part of the decision making process, and that was why it was such a surprise. If an ordinary Norwegian citizen was unaware of this, it could have been justified in the ignorance and general lack of interest that was discussed in the above paragraphs, but it was not. Another point to this is that this particular event neither was the start of nor represented a special kind of tyranny. As stated above, the politicians have sent soldiers into the tyranny for decades in previous operations, thus making the lack of awareness at this point even more surprising. An additional point to this is that the Norwegian population gets its information on the tyranny and that our soldiers are in a

warzone through media debates. It makes the distance between the politicians' awareness and the military reality visible to the society. "It is about moving focus from the Parliament's hallways to the reality on the ground in Afghanistan. The Norwegian people is poorly informed on what is happening. No Norwegian media has any form of permanent coverage of the war and the Norwegian efforts."²² This is not enhancing credibility in the decision makers, nor is it contributing to the mitigation of the tyranny. It only makes the soldiers on the ground wonder if their tyranny is known, understood and worthwhile and does not give them the appropriate *jus ad bello in bello* or *post bellum* they deserve. It only leaves the tyrants to make the decisions and the soldiers to handle their tyranny alone.

The basis for this essay has been Michael Walzer's description of "The Tyranny of War," where the decision makers are the tyrants who send soldiers into the tyranny. When the tyrants have the power to make such decisions, they also have a responsibility to mitigate the tyranny. This is explained through referring to Walzer's discussion of the elements of a Just War. He addresses the threefold responsibility decision makers have in justifying their decisions towards the international community. Decision makers should also have the same responsibility with regards to their soldiers who are the victims of their decisions. This Just War Theory is further used to underscore the complexity of the tyranny and to explain what the mitigation of this encompasses. Although the military itself has a responsibility to mitigate the tyranny, the decision makers' responsibility lies in their awareness of, interest in and focus on the military and the reality of the tyranny. This must not only be deeply rooted in the political environment, but also in the nation as a whole, the civilian society. Their role in the mitigation of the tyranny is to ensure the nation's support and backing of their soldiers, their awareness and acknowledgement of the soldiers effort and struggles in the threefold tyranny. The contemporary

Norwegian decision makers have allowed this sense of responsibility to decline. This is especially evident after the end of the Cold War. They seem to have neglected the fact that the tyranny is still present and has been since WW II - a tyranny that they, themselves, have chosen for their soldiers. The referenced debates in media are from 2003, 13 years after the Cold War. Although these debates contributed to opening the eyes of both some in the population and the decision makers, the ignorance and lack of interest is still present. The mitigation of the tyranny is still missing the deeply rooted acknowledgement and focus from the decision makers it needs.

Endnotes

- ¹ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars, a Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 31.
- ² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, UK 1976), 87.
- ³ Louis V Iasiello, *Jus Post Bellum: The Moral Responsibilities of Victors in War*, Warfare studies AY10 Coursebook, edited by Sharon McBride, (Maxwell AFB, Al: Air University Press, October 2009), 165.
- ⁴ Michael Walzer, *Arguing about War*, (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, UK, 2004), xiii.
- ⁵ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars, a Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 290.
- ⁶ Louis V Iasiello, *Jus Post Bellum: The Moral Responsibilities of Victors in War*, 165.
- ⁷ Ibid., 165.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ Ibid., 166.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 165.
- ¹¹ Ibid., 166.
- ¹² Ibid., 165.
- ¹³ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars, a Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 110.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., 291.
- ¹⁵ Michael Walzer, *Arguing about War*, 33.
- ¹⁶ Appendix A, *Norwegian participation in International Operations since WW II*. Norwegian armed forces' website, <http://www.mil.no/intops/start/operasjoner/article.jhtml?articleID=178929/>. (accessed 8 December 2009).
- ¹⁷ Norwegian armed forces' public website, "Norwegian forces abroad," <http://www.mil.no/intops/start/> (accessed 8 December 2009).
- ¹⁸ Dagbladet, "Humanitaer krig," *Dagbladet*, 30. juni 2003, <http://www.dagbladet.no/tekstarkiv/artikkel.php?id=5001030035388&tag=tit&words=humanitaer%3Bkrig/>. (accessed 8 December 2009).
- ¹⁹ Arne Foss, "Vi er i en krigssituasjon Befalets Fellesorganisasjon ber Bondevik si det som det er," *Dagbladet*, 14. november 2003, <http://www.dagbladet.no/tekstarkiv/artikkel.php?id=5001030060146&tag=tit&words=Vi%3Ber%3Bi%3Ben%3Bgssituasjon.%3BBefalets%3BFellesorganisasjon/>. (accessed 8 December 2009).
- ²⁰ Myhr, Kjell-Ivar, "Norsk F-16-pilot om bombingene i Afghanistan: -Vi er ikke kaldblodige mordere," *Dagbladet*, 24. februar 2003, <http://www.dagbladet.no/tekstarkiv/artikkel.php?id=5001030011123&tag=tit&words=Norsk%3BF-16%3Bpilot%3Bom%3Bbombingen%3Bi%3BAfghanistan%3A-Vi%3Ber%3Bikke%3Bkaldblodige%3Bmordere/>. (accessed 8 December 2009).
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² John Olav Egeland, "Norge i krig," *Dagbladet*, 16. November 2006, <http://www.dagbladet.no/tekstarkiv/artikkel.php?id=5001060082016&tag=tit&words=Norge%3Bi%3Bkrig/>. (accessed 8 December 2009).

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Appendix A
Norwegian participation in International Operations since WW II

Abbreviation	Operation, name, location	Timeframe	Number	Type
UNSCOB	UN Special Commision on Balcans, Hellas	1947	1	UN
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization, Midt-Østen	1948 - dd	575	UN
UNMOGIP	UN Military observer Group in India and Pakistan	1949-1994	140	UN
NORMASH	Norwegian Mobile Surgical Hospital Corea	1951-1954	623	UN
UNEF I	UN Emergency Force I, Gaza	1956-1967	10989	UN
UNOGIL	UN Observer Group in Lebanon	1958	54	UN
ONUC	Organization des Nations Unies au Congo	1960-1964	1173	UN
UNYOM	UN Yemen Observer Mission	1963-1964	7	UN
UNIPOM	UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission	1965-1966	2	UN
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon	1978-1999	34166	UN
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers, Sinai	1982-dd		Other
UNIIMOG	UN Iran-Irac Observer Mission	1988-1991	35	UN
UNAVEM I-II-III	UN Angola Verification Mission I	1989-1997	69	UN
GULF WAR	Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Persian Gulf	1991-1992	350	Other
UNIKOM	UN Kuwait Observer Mission	1991-1994	169	UN
ONUSAL	UN Observer Group in El Salvador	1992-1993	1	UN
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force	1992-1996	4401	UN
UNOSOM I-II	UN Operation in Somalia	1991-1993	260	UN
UNPF	UN Peace Forces, Former Yugoslavia	1995-1996	162	UN
UNPREDEP	UN Predeployment Force, FYR of Macedonia	1995-1999	808	UN
IFOR	NATO/PfP Implementation Force, Bosnia and Croatia	1995-1996	1777	NATO
UNTAES	UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, etc	1996-1998	16	UN
UNMOP	UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	1996-2002	5	UN
UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina	1996-1997	4	UN
SFOR	NATO/PfP Stabilization Force, Bosnia and Croatia	1996-dd	3650	NATO
MINUGUA	UN Mission for Verification of Human Rights, Guatemala	1997	3	UN
OSCE	OSCE Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina	1997-2000	5	OSCE
MONUA	UN Observer Mission in Angola	1997-1999	8	UN
OSCE	OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo	1998-1999	5	OSCE
ALLIED FORCE	NATO Air Operations against FRY	1999	250	NATO
AFOR	NATO/PfP Albanian Force	1999	10	NATO

KFOR	NATO/PfP Kosovo Force	1999-dd		NATO
UNMIK	UN Mission in Kosovo	1999-dd		UN
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone	1999-2000	5	UN
INTERFET	International Force in East Timor	1999	6	Other
UNTAET	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor	1999-dd	12	UN
UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	2000-dd	9	UN
TF HARVEST	NATO/TF HARVEST	2001	5	NATO
TF FOX/FYROM	NATO/TF FOX Op Amber Fox	2001-2002	6	NATO
ALLIED HARMONY	NATO/Op Allied Harmony	2002-2003	3	NATO
OEF	OP Enduring Freedom	2001-03	310	Other
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force	2002-		NATO
MONUC	Dr Congo	2002-2003	10	UN
EUFOR/FYROM	EU/Op Concordia	2003-		EU
Display Deterrence	Tyrkia	2003	4	NATO
AE/STROG	Active Endeavour/STROG	2003-		NATO
IRAK	Coalition operations in Iraq	2003	163	Other
UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan	2005-dd		UN
UNIFIL II	UN Interim Force in Lebanon II	2006-	140	UN
Total			60391	

The numbers from the "German brigade" not included. Numbers from still ongoing operations not depicted.